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Abstract
COVID-19 prevention strategies in resource limited settings, modelled on the earlier response in high income
countries, have thus far focused on draconian containment strategies, which impose movement restrictions on a
wide scale. These restrictions are unlikely to prevent cases from surging well beyond existing hospitalisation
capacity; not withstanding their likely severe social and economic costs in the long term.
We suggest that in low-income countries, time limited movement restrictions should be considered primarily as an
opportunity to develop sustainable and resource appropriate mitigation strategies. These mitigation strategies, if focused on
reducing COVID-19 transmission through a triad of prevention activities, have the potential to mitigate bed demand and
mortality by a considerable extent. This triade is based on a combination of high-uptake of community led shielding of high-
risk individuals, self-isolation of mild to moderately symptomatic cases, and moderate physical distancing in the community.
We outline a set of principles for communities to consider how to support the protection of the most vulnerable, by
shielding them from infection within and outside their homes. We further suggest three potential shielding options, with
their likely applicability to different settings, for communities to consider and that would enable them to provide access
to transmission-shielded arrangements for the highest risk community members. Importantly, any shielding strategy
would need to be predicated on sound, locally informed behavioural science and monitored for effectiveness and
evaluating its potential under realistic modelling assumptions. Perhaps, most importantly, it is essential that these
strategies not be perceived as oppressive measures and be community led in their design and implementation. This is in
order that they can be sustained for an extended period of time, until COVID-19 can be controlled or vaccine and
treatment options become available.
Background
Modelling predictions [1] suggest that uncontrolled
COVID-19 epidemics will result in 7.0 billion infections
and 40 million deaths globally this year, with the impact
expected to be most severe in low-income settings and
forcibly displaced populations [2]. Three mechanisms
could determine this: (i) higher transmissibility due to
larger household sizes [3], intense social mixing [4]
between the young and elderly [5], overcrowding in
urban slums and displaced people’s camps, inadequate
water and sanitation, and specific cultural and faith prac-
tices such as mass prayer gatherings, large weddings and
funerals during which super-spreading events might
propagate transmission disproportionately [6]; (ii) higher
infection-to-case ratios and progression to severe disease
due to the virus’ interaction with highly prevalent co-
morbidities, including non-communicable diseases
(NCDs; prevalence of hypertension and diabetes is often
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higher in low- than high-income settings [7, 8], with a
far lower treatment coverage [9]), undernutrition, tuber-
culosis [10, 11] and HIV10; and (iii) higher case-fatality
due to a dire lack of intensive care capacity, especially
outside large cities. Moreover, extreme pressure on cura-
tive health services could result in indirect impacts
resulting from disrupted care for health problems other
than COVID-19 [12]. These risks are exacerbated by the
inadequacy of pandemic plans that enable public health
systems to respond [13] adequately and without delay.
While it remains to be seen if these risk factors can be
counterbalanced by younger age distributions, on bal-
ance we believe that, given current evidence and plaus-
ible reasoning, drastic action is required immediately to
protect the world’s most fragile populations from this
unfolding threat. We present here our views on the chal-
lenges of current containment focused approaches con-
trasted to more realistic, economically and socially
amenable interventions, to limit COVID-19 transmission
even in the most resource-constrained settings.
Containment may buy some time – at best
In recent months low-income and crisis-affected coun-
tries have followed a global pattern of attempting to
interrupt further importation of COVID-19 from abroad
through border closures. Examples from China, South
Korea and Singapore [14] suggest that this approach
may enable containment at least for some time; it is,
however, very resource-intensive, and will inevitably re-
quire widespread testing and meticulous contact tracing
[15]. It is doubtful that these measures are replicable in
low-income and crisis settings, where inadequate surveil-
lance and less-than-sufficient testing may initially obfus-
cate the true extent of locally driven transmission.
Current mathematical modelling forecasts [16] predict
that even stringent lockdowns, similar to those imple-
mented in Europe, would be unlikely to prevent cases
from surging well beyond these countries’ existing hospi-
talisation capacity. Despite this, low-income countries
are increasingly adopting population wide physical dis-
tancing strategies, where all residents except essential
workers are asked to stay at home. This presents a diffi-
cult balance for low-income countries where the social
and economic cost of population-wide physical distan-
cing and travel restrictions, if sustained over a long
period, could be very harmful for fragile, export-
dependent economies and stretch livelihoods beyond
people’s coping ability, in turn dis-incentivising adher-
ence to control measures. In crises, both a lack of trust
between populations and national authorities and on-
going conflict can undermine a sweeping, one-size-fits-
all strategy [17], especially if applied coercively. In short,
a draconian containment strategy may be useful for a
limited time to allow countries to better prepare, but
risks failing beyond a horizon of weeks.
What can realistically be done?
Of the three mechanisms we describe above, two (higher
infection severity and case-fatality) appear less tractable
for the time being. Some interventions to mitigate sec-
ondary impacts could help and should be pursued
quickly (e.g. avoiding treatment interruptions for NCDs,
TB and HIV by supplying patients with several months
of medication through community health workers or
dedicated clinics that can reach these patients; intermit-
tent presumptive treatment to reduce other co-
morbidities; freeing up health care capacity by postpon-
ing non-essential services). Options for improving oxy-
gen therapy in low-resource settings could be explored
[18]. However, there appears to be little realistic pro-
spect of scaling up intensive care to the levels required
for COVID-19, where demand in a typical low-income
setting for critical care beds, even in the mitigated sce-
narios, is predicted to outstrip supply by a factor of 25
[19]. Isolation of cases in dedicated, but not high-
intensity wards might offer neither clinical benefit nor
meaningful transmission reductions, as most transmis-
sion would still be attributable [20] to low-risk infections
[21] and the proportion of the infectiousness period
spent pre-admission [22, 23], e.g. among household
members. Moreover, without sufficient training and in-
fection control supplies, such facilities would pose a
major threat to the health of clinicians, already a very
scarce resource in most low-income and crisis settings.
However for the majority of LICs, where testing is not
widely available, syndromic diagnosis could also result in
inadvertent mixing and thus cross-transmission between
true COVID-19 cases and patients with other acute re-
spiratory infections.
By contrast, the mechanism of higher transmissibility
appears more amenable to economically and socially
feasible interventions, even in the most resource-
constrained settings. Here too, however, a range of pos-
sible strategies may be considered. In order for
population-wide physical distancing measures, increas-
ingly being pursued in low-income settings, to realistic-
ally achieve sufficient impact on their own, these would
require most non-essential workers to work from home
or not at all, a strategy ill-suited to the economies and
remote-working capability of low-income settings.
Moreover, this must be sustained over a long period,
until a vaccine, treatment or both are available at scale.
We thus suggest that, where dispersive strategies target-
ing the general population are difficult to implement, en-
force and/or sustain [24–26], leading to ongoing
transmission among low-risk populations [27, 28], it will
be crucial to focus resources on maximizing the impact
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of strategies to protect those most vulnerable to severe
outcomes, in essence shielding them to the extent pos-
sible from the risk of infection. A recent modelling study
[16] of the epidemic in three African countries (repre-
senting the range of age distributions on the continent)
suggests that a combination of self-isolation, moderate
distancing and high-uptake shielding would mitigate bed
demand and mortality to a considerable extent.
Shielding high-risk populations: general principles
In Ebola epidemics, isolating the ill into a contaminated
‘red zone’ is mainly needed to protect the healthy. For
COVID-19, this paradigm is upturned: from the perspec-
tive of the highest risk groups, unless they can be
shielded from infection and cared for while shielding,
the red zone is everywhere. While stressing that no sin-
gle approach is likely to fit all low-income or crisis set-
tings, we outline below a set of principles that,
implemented together, could support the general aim of
protecting those most vulnerable from infection by help-
ing them to live safely, dignifiedly and separately from
their families and neighbours for what could be an ex-
tended period of time, until COVID-19 can be con-
trolled or vaccine and treatment options become
available.
Who should be shielded?
Evolving information so far suggests a rapid increase in
COVID-19 severity and mortality with age with a par-
ticularly high risk among people aged above 70 years
and/or living with NCDs and other immuno-suppressing
conditions [29, 30]. In the absence of evidence to the
contrary we suggest that in low-income or crisis-affected
populations the high-risk definition could be extended
to those aged 60 years or above (a more meaningful
proxy of old age in countries that have not completed
the epidemiologic and demographic transition). It should
also expressly consider those living with TB or HIV, and
malnourished adults. TB patients, however, would likely
need dedicated isolation arrangements in order to avoid
close-quarters TB transmission.
How should effective shielding be achieved?
Table 1 suggests three options for housing high-risk
community members into transmission-shielded ar-
rangements, with their likely applicability to different
settings. Under options 1 and 2, it may be assumed that
healthy household members are able to care (e.g. bathe,
feed) for those with disabilities and the elderly; including
low-risk carers (particularly those previously infected
and thus probably immune) could also be an option. In
the majority of communities with single room dwellings
where option 1 is not possible, option 2 may be a viable
option. While an extreme version of option 3, namely
resettling large numbers (e.g. many hundreds) of high-
risk people in dedicated buildings or neighbourhoods,
might also be conceivable, we have discounted it due to
likely high cost, potential lack of acceptance of elders be-
ing separated from families, and the risk of large-scale
harm if transmission is seeded within such a concen-
trated ‘green zone’.
Social mobilization, community engagement, and
coordination
As demonstrated globally, risk communication of the ur-
gency of an unseen threat is difficult. It is essential that
Table 1 Options for housing high-risk persons into designated ‘green zones’
Option Description Applicability Notes
1. Household-
level shielding
Each household demarcates a room or
shelter for high-risk members. If neces-
sary, a carer from the household is iso-
lated with them.
Settings with multi-shelter compounds or
multi-room houses.
Likely preferable to families with space
available but also more likely to be ‘leaky’
if isolation is not strictly enforced.
2. Street- or
extended family-
level shielding
Neighbouring households (e.g. 5–10) or
members of an extended family within a
defined geographic locale
(neighbourhood, district) voluntarily
‘house-swap’ and group their high-risk
members into dedicated houses /
shelters.
All, but especially urban settings. Infection control and physical distancing
measures would also have to be strictly
observed within each green zone.
3.
Neighbourhood-
or sector-level
isolation
Sections of the settlement are put aside
for groups of high-risk people (e.g. 50–
100).
High density camps/settlements (e.g.
refugee/IDP camps, slums, informal
settlements for migrants where
humanitarian actors can provide
supportive services and smaller scale
isolation is not possible.
Ideally located at the periphery of camps
to facilitate such measures.
Infection control and physical distancing
measures would also have to be strictly
observed within each green zone.
We have discounted this option due to
likely high cost, potential lack of
acceptance of elders being separated
from families, and the risk of large-scale
harm if transmission is seeded within
such a concentrated ‘green zone’.
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these strategies not be perceived as an oppressive meas-
ure and have strong buy-in from the communities. All
potential shielding strategies must be discussed from the
beginning with communities so that they may be able to
spontaneously and rapidly self-organize along not only
epidemiologically sound principles but also culturally ap-
propriate practices and with care not to exasperate
already existing COVID-19 stigma. To this end, existing
networks of community health workers and Red Cross
and Red Crescent volunteers could be mobilised to liaise
with community voluntary networks [31] to set-up local
social care committees. These committees could be
tasked with disseminating culturally appropriate infor-
mation on behaviour change, facilitating a decision
among the community as to which ‘green zone’ arrange-
ment works for them, facilitating the community to con-
tribute to the logistics of the effort, and coordinating the
provision of food and supplies to high-risk residents.
Such social mobilization and community engagement ef-
forts could adapt relevant lessons learned and guidance
developed in response to the Ebola epidemic [32], such
as the need for locally-developed and facilitated action
plans that are voluntary and protect basic human rights
[33] and the satisfaction of basic non-COVID-19 needs.
Local and international development and humanitarian
actors, whose support accounts for a substantial (or, in
the case of most camps, total) share of public service de-
livery, could contribute meaningfully by supplying infec-
tion control supplies (e.g. soap and water), supporting
livelihoods, enabling local care committees and provid-
ing or strengthening mobile, dedicated medical treat-
ment. This support would be mobilized through existing
humanitarian coordination mechanisms and emergency
operations centres.
Infection control, active surveillance, and safeguarding
Stringent but realistic infection control and surveillance
measures should accompany any of the options, as
should some physical distancing within the green zone,
especially under option 3. To facilitate acceptability, the
green zone’s boundaries should probably remain virtual,
but a single physical entry point, featuring handwashing
facilities, should be established: food and other provi-
sions should only be exchanged through this point. A
meeting area where visitors can interact with loved ones
at a safe distance and mobile, outpatient care can be
provided could also be set up. Measures for active sur-
veillance within the green zone, including appropriate
screening and immediate isolation and where available,
testing, of residents with symptoms consistent with
COVID-19, should be added. This is in order to both
provide early warning of infection and monitor the ef-
fects of shielding. Safeguarding mechanisms, such as
providing additional support to individuals who are at
risk of experiencing abuse or neglect, should also be
introduced.
When to start isolating? When to stand down?
Because of its short serial interval [34] and relatively
high transmissibility, an uncontrolled COVID-19 epi-
demic would likely peak rapidly [35] depending upon
various assumptions. While control measures currently
being rolled out might slow this progression, the weak-
ness of surveillance systems and inevitable implementa-
tion delays suggests a pragmatic need to roll out the
proposed approach now.
However, isolating at-risk people has risks that should
be acknowledged; if the virus infects the shielded group,
it could move quickly among them, as noted in nursing
homes in high-income countries. This will thus require
effective surveillance and outbreak control in the green
zone as well as outside. In separate guidance for camp
and urban settings, we suggest mitigating interventions
to reduce the risk of virus introduction and spread
within green zones. Decisions about how to establish
green zones must be weighed against continuing with
the existing arrangements. Such decisions are difficult,
and clearly ethically challenging. Isolating at-risk individ-
uals for a long period of time will be psychologically tax-
ing for the community, and as such, psychosocial
support will be needed. Shielding should be discontinued
as soon as safe to do so. In the absence of widespread
testing, surveillance of adult mortality, the incidence of
acute respiratory distress syndrome and/or continuous
testing in sentinel sites, with simple stand-down thresh-
olds (e.g. a period with no suspected cases of COVID-19
within a given radius) is preferable to relying on weaker
national-level surveillance: this remains to be explored,
as any syndromic approach is complicated by the high
background of other respiratory infections.
Conclusion
While the targeted approach we have outlined may only
be one of several possible interventions, we believe that
it may offer a realistic solution for allocating scarce re-
sources to maximise impact in settings where scaling up
treatment significantly is unlikely to be an option. Other
feasible, high-yield interventions should be undertaken
simultaneously, e.g. staying home if sick, limiting public
transport use, reducing super-spreading events at fu-
nerals or other mass gatherings, promoting hand-
washing, soap distribution and/or at least maintaining
treatment coverage for risk-factor co-morbidities.
Clearly, any shielding strategy would need to be predi-
cated on sound, locally informed behavioural science
and monitored for effectiveness, e.g. by measuring trans-
mission or mortality within isolation ‘green zones’ and
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evaluating its potential under realistic modelling
assumptions.
Whenever vaccines, improved therapeutics, or rapid
testing for COVID-19 become available, these must be
allocated equitably to low-income and crisis-affected
populations. Until then, it is imperative that low-
resource countries and humanitarian responses plan and
roll out evidence-based, long-term strategies to mitigate
their COVID-19 epidemics, starting now. Approaches
such as containment of importation are likely to have
exhausted their potential in the immediate future; not all
interventions are of equal value, and the opportunity
costs of emphasising one over the other should be con-
sidered. The price of inaction may be high. Sub-optimal,
inefficient control interventions could, however, be just
as costly.
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